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As Edwards (2004, p. 260) states, “people are shown to formulate or work 
up the nature of events, actions, and their own accountability, through ways of 
talking. These “ways of talking” are constructive and action-oriented.” This 
means that people do build the world they live in through their selection of 
words. Keeping this in mind, we contrasted two actions (commitment to the 
truth and defensive stance) in one particular scenario: the Brexit contest. For 
this purpose, we analyzed politicians’ selection of adverbs of certainty and 
extreme case formulations (ECFs) in both the 1975 Referendum and the Brexit 
(2016). We contrasted both the time (the 1975 Referendum vs. the Brexit) and the 
position (“Anti” vs. “Pro” Europe positions). Thus, the main goal of this paper 
was to discover if politicians in the 1975 Referendum and the Brexit: (a) framed a 
similar or different reality through their discourse choices; and (b) used the same 
types of adverbs of certainty and ECFs and with the same frequency.
All these politicians share a common reality: the British political contest 
against or in favor of Europe. As Perloff (2018) points out when talking about 
political communication, the key element in most political contexts is power. 
According to Joseph Nye (a US political analyst), there are two different types 
of power: hard and soft power. Whereas the first one is related to military and 
economic power, the second is defined as the power of “getting others to want 
what you want” (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Nye also explains that the “effective study 
of international politics depends today upon our understanding of the interplay 
between […] the politics of territory, guns or money and the language of narrating 
the world in coherent and persuasive stories.” (Chouliaraki, 2005, p. 2). So, the 
way we narrate the world frames the world we live in. It is for this reason that 
we have compared the similarities and/or differences in the way in which these 
politicians framed that particular reality through their specific selection of words 
regarding the adverbs of certainty and the ECFs.
In this particular political context, extreme attitudes are common because 
“conflict can breed attitude extremity, which in turn serves to maintain or 
increase conflict.” (Abelson, 1995, p. 25). For this reason, we have decided to 
focus our attention on discourse choices that are related to attitudinal intensity 
and strength. As Krosnick and Petty (1995, p. 11) explain “investigators have 
presumed that attitudinal intensity can be measured via certainty (Brim, 1955; 
Guttman & Suchman, 1947; Katz, 1944; McDill, 1959; Suchman, 1950) or 
extremity (McDill, 1959; Tannenbaum, 1956).” So, an in-depth analysis of the 
specific discourse strategies used to express certainty and extremity could be 
very productive.
According to Krosnick and Petty (1995, p. 7), “attitude certainty refers to the 
degree to which an individual is confident in his or her attitude toward an object.” 
A very common linguistic category that is clearly related to the expression of 
certainty and confidence is the adverb of certainty. As Simon-Vandenbergen 
and Aijmer (2007) explain (p. 69), “adverbs should express the speaker’s strong 
commitment to the truth of the proposition, i.e. that they should express a rather 
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high degree of probability.” So, some adverbs might express strong conviction 
and some others - weaker ones. Additionally, their use might depend on contextual 
reasons. Thus, we believe it could be quite revealing to research into their use in 
one specific scenario: the British political contest against or in favor of Europe. 
We followed a selection of the modal adverbs of certainty from the ICE-GB 
(International Corpus of English-Great Britain) that Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer (2007, p. 69) offered in their study.
Additionally, Edwards (2000, p. 347-348) explains that ECFs are “descriptions 
or assessments that deploy extreme expressions such as every, all, none, best, 
least, as good as it gets, always, perfectly, brand new, and absolutely.” Pomerantz 
(1986, p. 227) summarizes the three main uses of ECFs in the following way:
(1) to assert the strongest case in anticipation of nonsympathetic hearings,
(2) to propose the cause of a phenomenon,
(3) to speak for the rightness (wrongness) of a practice.
In both cases (i.e., adverbs of certainty and ECFs), they are not only indexing 
the speaker’s stance or attitude but also “a state of affairs is portrayed as believable, 
obvious, compelling” (Pomerantz, 1986, p. 219). For this reason, we believe that 
a contrastive study of both could be very revealing when detailing what kind of 
reality these politicians are building in their contest. In this specific study, we 
analyzed ECFs such as those that express negation, globalism, or exclusiveness 
and also adverbs of frequency/degree/manner, adjectives, numbers, and nouns 
that convey some kind of extreme description or assessment.
First of all, we provide a brief introduction to the main characteristics that 
feature political communication. Then, we offer a brief review of the main traits 
and uses of both the expressions of certainty (adverbs of certainty) and ECFs. 
Next, a brief summary about the Brexit contest is offered. Subsequently, we 
provide an account of the methodology we have followed. Afterwards, a detailed 
explanation of the results of our analysis is presented. Finally, we finish with our 
conclusions.
Political Communication
The term “political communication” seems, at first, difficult to be defined. 
In this sense, Denton and Woodward (1990) identify the senders’ intention 
to influence the political setting as the key defining element in political 
communication. Perloff (2018, p. 30) also includes this element in the following 
definition of political communication:
Political communication is the process by which language and symbols, 
employed by leaders, media, or citizens, exert intended or unintended 
effects on the political cognitions, attitudes, or behaviors of individuals or 
on outcomes that bear on the public policy of a nation, state, or community.
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Similarly, Ball (2011, p. 42) describes political communication as “the practice 
of using language to move people to think and act in ways that they might not 
otherwise think and act.” So, the language used in political communication could 
be described as a “powerful language,” a language with “colourful phrases, apt 
metaphors, syntax and rhythm” with the main purpose of “molding attitudes and 
move citizens” (Perloff 2018, p. 30). For this reason, McNair (2011) establishes 
a very reasonable comparison between commercial marketing and political 
marketing as they both share the main goal: to market a product in the case of 
the first one and to sell an idea in the case of the second. Only powerful political 
actors with a powerful language can sell their ideas. Additionally, politics is a 
fight for power. As Perloff (2018, p. 35) explains, “leaders invoke language, 
symbols, and the trappings of their offices to gain and maintain power.” 
To be more specific, in this paper, we followed Denton and Woodward 
(1990) and McNair (2011) in identifying political communication as purposeful 
communication embracing the following elements (McNair, 2011): (a) all forms 
of communication with politicians and other political actors who wish to reach 
some specific goals, (b) communication aimed at these actors by nonpoliticians 
(i.e., citizens, newspaper columnists, etc.), and (c) communication about these 
actors and their actions, mainly by media coverage. As McNair (2011) explains, 
in this scenario, we can distinguish: political organizations (parties, public 
organizations, pressure groups, terrorist organizations and governments), the 
media, and citizens. They all play an essential role in political communication 
because, as Perloff (2018, p, 35) points out, “leaders, media, and citizens 
symbolically joust among themselves and fram[e] problems in different ways.” 
A key idea here is that of framing. According to Entman (1993, p. 52) framing:
… essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described.
In this way, as Scheufele (1999) argues, framing is a kind of social 
constructivism because individuals can frame their own reality. This is particularly 
evident in the case of political communication. As Kaid et al. (1991) defend, 
political reality is made up of three important categories: an objective reality 
(actual events), a subjective reality (individuals’ perceptions), and a constructed 
reality (events presented by the media). As a matter of fact, the media plays a 
determining role in the process of framing. As Perloff (2018, p. 35) explains, “the 
news media’s choice of issues, and the way they frame the news, can influence 
leaders and the public.” When talking about the conventional media (newspapers, 
magazines, and television), Perloff (2018, p. 41) added that “they convey a 
message to the audience, ignoring, selecting, shaping, and framing information 
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based on a host of factors.” In this sense, the Internet’s role as an extremely 
important source of information that might frame the individuals’ reality must be 
emphasized. As Zhuravskaya et al. (2020, p. 416) explain:
Many commentators suggest that the Internet in general, and social media 
in particular, plays a key role in amplifying economic, political, and cultural 
grievances across the globe and, perhaps even more important, that they have 
their own independent effects on politics in both established democracies and 
autocratic regimes.
In this sense, social media’s role in the results of the Brexit Referendum 
(2016) is particularly important. Gorodnichenko et al. (2018) explored the 
diffusion of information on Twitter during the Brexit Referendum and the 2016 
U.S. Presidential Election. Their results show that the aggressive use of Twitter 
bots could have contributed to the vote outcomes. As Hänska and Bauchowitz 
(2017) indicated, social media is a channel not only for users (meaning regular 
citizens), but also for journalists and politicians. As a matter of fact, as they point 
out, 87% of British MPs have Twitter accounts. Hänska and Bauchowitz (2017, p. 
29) conclude in their study that:
It is clear from our analysis that Twitter users who supported leaving the EU 
were more numerous, and Eurosceptic users in general were more active (they 
tweeted more frequently) than Remain users […] Other researchers examining 
Google Search trends, Instagram posts and Facebook found similar patterns 
of Eurosceptic views being communicated with greater intensity by a greater 
number of users on those platforms (Herrman, 2016, Polonski, 2016).
Press coverage also played a determining role in the results of the Brexit 
Referendum. As Hänska and Bauchowitz (2017, p. 30) explain, they “also favored 
leaving the EU. Weighted for circulation, 82 percent of newspaper articles in the 
lead-up to the Referendum supported leaving the EU.” Similar results have also 
been presented by Deacon (2016).
The Expression of Certainty: Adverbs of Certainty
As Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, p. 1) state, “modality has always 
been a fascinating area to philosophers, logicians as well as linguists, and has 
been approached from a large number of different perspectives.” English shows a 
wide variety of resources to communicate modality: modal nouns (Akiba, 2016; 
Ilkhanipour, 2016), adjectives (Van linden, 2012), adverbs (Rozumko, 2017; 
Velasquez, 2014), modal auxiliaries (Biber et al., 1999; Coates, 1983; Huddleston 
& Pullum, 2002; Palmer, 1990; Quirk et al., 1985) and lexical verbs (Dontcheva-
Navratilova, 2018; Salazar & Verdaguer, 2009;). Zhang (2019, p. 879) explains that:
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Assertion deals with factual propositions based on the real knowledge of the 
worlds, while modality focuses on the necessities and possibilities of the 
proposition. Modality is an important semantic category that attracts many 
scholars’ interest. Many expressions in our lives are related to modality. 
Modality often deals with possibility and necessity.
The relationship that Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007) establish 
between epistemic certainty and evidentiality is particularly important. As they 
explain, many linguists set forth that “speakers’ commitment to the truth value 
of their utterance is to be taken for granted in communication, and hence that 
expressions of certainty are either superfluous or signal something else.” (p. 2). 
This idea has generated important doubts and “it signals the problem of why people 
express certainty” (p. 2). This is the main reason why Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer (2007) endeavored to offer a full description of modal certainty, and more 
specifically, modal adverbs as they are used in present-day English. As Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer explain (2007, p. 69), “adverbs should express the 
speaker’s strong commitment to the truth of the proposition, i.e., that they should 
express a rather high degree of probability.” It is obvious that it is a matter of 
degrees. Some adverbs might express strong conviction and some others weaker 
ones. It is also convenient to highlight that their use might depend on contextual 
reasons. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, p. 69) offer a table of the 
modal adverbs of certainty in the ICE-GB (International Corpus of English-Great 
Britain). The following adverbs are considered in this table: of course; certainly; 
obviously (manner not included); indeed; clearly (manner not included); no 
doubt; definitely; necessarily; surely; undoubtedly; naturally; inevitably; plainly; 
evidently; arguably; for sure; admittedly; for certain; decidedly; undeniably; 
unquestionably. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, p. 69) list them in order 
of frequency.
As it was previously pointed out, the use of these modals adverbs clearly 
depends on the context and type of social activity (social roles, power, etc.). 
As Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007, p. 5) clearly state, “with this study 
we hope to contribute to the discussion on the association between individual 
speaker’s ‘small’ choices from the repertoire of modal certainty expressions and 
“large” issues such as societal relations.” This idea is intrinsically linked to our 
goal in this paper: We examined if there is any connection between a speaker’s 
choice of adverbs of certainty and the specific context in which they are being 
used, more specifically, the political arena.
Defending a Position: Extreme Case Formulations
As it was stated above, it seems that many investigators (Brim, 1955; Guttman 
& Suchman, 1947; Katz, 1944; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; McDill, 1959; Suchman, 
1950; Tannenbaum, 1956) assume that attitudinal intensity can be measured via 
certainty or extremity. So, there is a solid relationship between certainty and 
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extremity. According to Krosnick and Petty (1995, p. 6) “extremity is the extent to 
which the attitude deviates from neutrality. The more extreme an attitude is, the more 
an individual likes or dislikes the object.” For this reason, we believe that there is a 
strong connection with what Pomerantz (1986) calls ECFs. As Edwards and Potter 
(1992) defend, discourse is an ongoing activity constructing and making relevant 
the participants’ emotional feelings and attitudes. These attitudes are examined as 
evaluative practices done in discourse. For this reason, we believe that it would be 
quite revealing to check if our speakers’ attitudes (politicians in the Brexit contest 
in this case) are much more concerned with the expression of certainty or with the 
defense of a stance in an extreme way.
Whitehead (2015) adds two more functions: (a) to index a speaker’s investment 
in a claim, to upgrade a prior assessment; and (b) to exaggerate, tease, ironize and 
joke. 
Finally, as it has already been pointed out in Iñigo-Mora (2007), politicians 
seem to favor this kind of language. Iñigo-Mora (2007) carried out a case study 
in which she contrasted the ECFs used in nine English panel interviews (about 
political, socio-political, and social issues) and four political pre-electoral debates. 
She concluded that 
the number of ECFs found in the Spanish and in the English corpora differs 
considerably … And in relation to the type of recording, the data reveal that (a) 
interviewers and interviewees deployed many more ECFs in political recordings 
(2.8 percent) than in social-political (1.2 percent) or social recordings (1.3 
percent); and (b) politicians used more ECFs (4.8 percent) than any other type 
of interviewees (1.5 percent; p. 341).
The Brexit Contest
In 1973, the United Kingdom (UK) joined the European Union (EU), but 
as Tendera-Właszczuk (2018, p. 307) explains, “from the very beginning the 
UK membership in the EU has been marked by many tensions. One of the most 
important problem was the discussion on the future model of the integration.” This 
has provoked an important dichotomy between Pro-European (normally associated 
to Labour party) and Anti-European (normally associated to Conservative party) 
ideologies. These two contrasting views have originated two important plebiscites: 
the 1975 Referendum and the Brexit (2016). The results of these two plebiscites 
have been completely different. In the case of the 1975 Referendum, it ended up 
with the decision of staying in the Common Market (68% of all voters wanted to 
stay). In the case of the Brexit referendum, the results led the UK to leave the EU 
(52% of the voters chose to leave the EU). In the 1975 Referendum, the question 
was: “Do you think the UK should stay in the EU (the Common Market)? In the 
Brexit the question was “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union or leave the European Union?”
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There are many studies (Campos et al., 2014; Minford, 2006; Pain & Young, 
2004; Ottaviano et al., 2014) that concluded that joining a monetary union was 
beneficial to the United Kingdom. We suppose that those potential benefits were 
the reason why, in 1975, the British society decided to stay in the Common Market. 
So, what provoked such a change of opinion in 2016? Melkumian (2018, p. 40) 
found that “changing demographic trend - the aging of the UK population - is the 
reason for the "Leave the Union" majority vote in 2016 Referendum.” Melkumian 
(2018, p. 42) shows in two very illustrating tables the revealing differences in the 
demographic profile referendum voting in 1975 and 2016 by age (voters only). 
Whereas most “over 65” voters (70%) voted YES (stay) in 1975, most “over 65” 
(61%) voted NO (leave) in 2016. Melkumian (2018, p. 42) points out that: 
Voters in the age group of 18-24 were born into the European Union and enjoyed 
the benefits of unification their entire life. For them, separating from the EU 
is going back in time, regressing into separation and isolation The youngest 
voters in 1975 would currently (the year of 2016 vote) be in 61+ years of age 
group. And these voters will be captured in the last two columns of Table 2: age 
50-64 and 65-. And these two columns show a very determined vote to leave 
the European Union (56% and 61% voted to leave the EU in the respective age 
groups of 50-64 and 65-) … It suggests that expectations of the young people 
voting "yes" to the unification in 1975 were not met. It suggests disappointment 
in and resentment towards the Union or the policies the UK had to adapt and 
follow as the Union member.
It is difficult to pinpoint the reason(s) for this decision to leave the EU, but the 
numbers show that a large number of disappointed elderly people have influenced a 
lot the future of young Britons. As Melkumian (2018, p. 44) concludes, “the major 
reason for the older voters choosing "To leave the EU" was their increasing degree 
of relative risk aversion to uncertainties brought into their lives by the membership 
in the European Union.” 
Methodology
The corpus was made up of eight different recordings. Four of them were about 
the Brexit and four about the 1975 Referendum. In each of these two sets, two 
recordings were Pro-European and two were Anti-European. Additionally, two 
recordings were parliamentary speeches and two were political interviews. Each 
recording was around 5 minutes long. Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of this 
descriptive data:
Since the corpus contained sharply opposite views (Pro-European vs. Anti-
European), we analyzed absolute expressions of opinion: (a) all ECFs expressions 
and (b) all adverbs of certainty included in Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer’s 
table (2007, p. 69). We contrasted the rate of use of both (i.e., ECFs vs. adverbs 
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of certainty) and focused on possible differences and/or similarities, taking into 
account the time of the event (Brexit vs. 1975 Referendum) and the positions (Pro-
European vs. Anti-European).
As the recordings were not of the same length, we decided to use ratios, taking 
into account the number of words. Specifically, we calculated the number of adverbs 
of certainty and ECFs for every one hundred words of the transcript. In this way, the 
results are biased by the differences in the total length of each transcript.
Results and Discussion
We first contrasted the ratio of adverbs of certainty included in Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer’s table (2007, p. 69) and ECFs (see Tables 3 and 4). The 
first difference was the low rate of adverbs of certainty (0.17) in contrast to high 
the rate of ECFs (1.03). This shows that politicians, no matter the time (The 1975 
Referendum or The Brexit) or position (Anti-European or Pro-European), are more 
prone to display extreme opinions than to demonstrate certainty.
Table 1. The 1975 Referendum recordings.
















speech 05.06.1975 684 4 min
Tony Benn3 Conservative Anti-European Interview 1990* 777 4 min 5 s
Peter Shore4 Labour Anti-European
Parliamentary 
speech 05.06.1975 652 4 min 6 s
Table 2. The Brexit recordings.










speech 11.12.2017 549 5 min 30 s










speech 11.12.2017 940 6 min 10 s
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7W67Xppg434
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I2jUYryRYII&t=4715s
3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LzJEzO3AMOQ. Tony Benn on Clive Anderson Talks.
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I2jUYryRYII
5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CnSn9wwcyuU&t=1053s





A difference between the overall rate of adverbs of certainty in the Anti-
European position (0.15) and the Pro-European position (0.19) was also revealed 
(see Table 5). Those who were in the Pro-European position were more prone 
to show certainty, perhaps because they want to show a “sure and solid” way 
towards Europe. Peter Shore explained in a parliamentary speech (05.06.1975) 
that British people should be free to make their laws and should not allow “third 
countries” to interfere into Britons’ issues, and he compared that situation with 
the relation between Canada and USA, as they both have commercial relations, 
but they do not interfere in the laws of the other country. Peter Shore says:
Do you think Canada, 22 million of people, and to the south a great and 
friendly nation – yes, they are – but do you think Canada is going to allow its 
laws to be written by the 200 million people in some union in America? No, 
no – of course not.
In order to show complete certainty about his argument, at the end of his 
speech, he used a definite “of course” which communicates absolute self-
confidence.
Table 6 shows the ratio of adverbs of certainty in both plebiscites. The 
difference in the ratio of adverbs of certainty used in the 1975 Referendum 
recording set (0.13) and in the Brexit recording set (0.21) is notable. According 
to Gross et al. (1995), many factors affect attitude certainty. They mention 
some external factors (informational/cognitive and social/consensual) and some 
Table 3. Ratio of adverbs of certainty.
Position Type of corpus Number of adverbs of certainty Ratio
Anti-European
The 1975 Referendum 
corpus 1 0.07
The Brexit corpus 4 0.22
Pro-European
The 1975 Referendum 
corpus 3 0.19
The Brexit corpus 3 0.19
Total 11 0.17
Table 4. Ratio of extreme case formulations
Position Type of corpus Number of ECFs Ratio
Anti-European
The 1975 Referendum 
corpus 23 1.61
The Brexit corpus 17 0.95
Pro-European
The 1975 Referendum 
corpus 15 0.99
The Brexit corpus 10 0.64
Total 65 1.03
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personal attributes that might determine uncertainty reduction. Among the 
informational/cognitive factors they mention (p. 220-222) are:
• Knowledge: “Direct experience with an attitude object increases both 
latitude of rejection and opinion certainty.”
• Thought: “Amount of thought, however, need not necessarily increase 
certainty.
• Accessibility: “Three contributors to attitude accessibility or availability 
have been considered determinants of confidence: familiarity, internal 
consistency and salience.”
• Framing: “Framing (or cognitive priming) affects certainty.”
Concerning social/consensual factors, Gross et al. (1995, p. 223) explain 
that:
Other theorizing emphasizes the role of consensus in uncertainty reduction 
discovering that our attitudes are normative […], shared by people with 
whom we identify […] shared by others in informal conversation […] or 
shared by those we seek for comparison
All these factors being considered in our specific scenarios (i.e., two 
plebiscites regarding the same decision), and taking into account the results in 
Table 6, it can be concluded both knowledge and accessibility regarding the 
political position of the UK in Europe was higher among British politicians 
in 2016 than in 1975. That might have provoked the increase in the number of 
adverbs of certainty in 2016. In 1975, politicians had to face this decision for the 
very first time, whereas in 2016, they had already had direct experience with this 
issue and they were familiar with it (i.e., knowledge and familiarity). 
Table 7 shows the distribution of adverbs of certainty. It is also notable that 
the one politician who used more adverbs of certainty than the rest of politicians 
(no matter the Pro- or Anti-European position) was Boris Johnson (0.35) in his 
Table 5. Adverbs of certainty in the Anti- and in Pro-European positions.
Position Number of words Number of adverbs of certainty Ratio
Anti-European 3216 5 0.15
Pro-European 3090 6 0.19
Total 6306 11 0.17
Table 6. Ratio of adverbs of certainty in both plebiscites.
Type of corpus Number of words Number of adverbs Ratio
The 1975 Referendum 
corpus 2953 4 0.13
The Brexit corpus 3353 7 0.21
Total 6306 11 0.17
131 IÑIGO-MORA
interview. He used the adverb “certainly” twice and in the same sentence when 
the interviewer asks him “why you have decided now we should be better off 
outside the EU.” Johnson answers:
we would then get a much better deal and when you could end stay in I have 
to say I think that that is if you certainly true that if you want to leave all 
your options are good and you could certainly strike a great free trade deal 
with the European union
In this answer, Johnson is stating his full certainty about the positive 
consequences of leaving the EU. Perhaps this certainty stance was one of the 
reasons for his success in the Brexit contest. It could be a coincidence, but the 
numbers show that those who used adverbs of frequency much more regularly 
in the 1975 Referendum also won the contest: Pro-European with rates of 0.24 
and 0.15 in contrast to Anti-European with rates of 0 and 0.15. So, it seems that 
there is a correlation between the frequency of adverbs of certainty and success. 
The choice we make of the words we use are not just random selections, as 
discursive psychology (DP) defends (Edwards, 2004, p. 260):
Rather than people having memories, script knowledge, attitudes, etc, 
that they carry around in their heads and produce on cue (or in research 
interview), people are shown to formulate or work up the nature of events, 
actions, and their own accountability, through ways of talking. These “ways 
of talking” are constructive and action-oriented.
In other words, we build the world we live in through the selection of words 
we use. This could be a reason why there is a correlation between ways of talking 
and the construction of realities. 
In the following extract taken from May’s parliamentary speech, the way 
she frames her reality can be seen:
Table 7. Distribution of adverbs of certainty.
Position Recordings Politician Number of adverbs of certainty Ratio
Anti-European
The 1975 Referendum
T. Benn 0 0
P. Shore 1: “of course” 0.15
Brexit
B. Johnson 3: “certainly” (x2) and “obviously” 0.35
T. May 1: “clearly” 0.11
Pro-European
The 1975 Referendum
H. Wilson 2: “certainly” and “indeed” 0.24
E. Heath 1: “of course” 0.15
Brexit
J. Corbyn 1: “of course” 0.18
2: “certainly” and “obviously” 0.19
Total 11 0.17
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we have argued robustly and clearly for the outcomes we seek: a fair and 
reciprocal deal that will guarantee the rights of more than 3 million EU 
citizens living in the UK and 1 million UK nationals living in the EU, so that 
they can carry on living their lives as before; a fair settlement of the accounts, 
meeting our rights and obligations as a departing member state in the spirit of 
our future partnership …  this is conditional upon a number of principles we 
have negotiated over how we will ultimately arrive at a fair valuation of these 
commitments … It is a fair settlement for the British taxpayer, who will soon 
see significant savings compared with remaining in the European Union …
May combines two different strategies. First, she advances” that her attitude 
towards what she is going to explain is one of absolute certainty (“robustly 
and clearly”) and then she repeats up to four times the word “fair:” “a fair and 
reciprocal deal,” “a fair settlement of the accounts,” “a fair valuation,” and “a 
fair settlement.” In this way, she selects and highlights “some facets of events 
or issues, and mak[es] connections among them so as to promote a particular 
interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.” (Entman, 2004, p. 5). The particular 
interpretation that May is promoting is one of a “clear, complete and fully fair 
new reality.” In other words, she is framing a particular reality she wants to build 
in her audience’s minds: she wants every single member of her audience to share 
with her the same interpretation of a “fair” new reality in favor of the Brexit. 
This is a very well-known strategy among politicians, as Perloff (2018, p. 159) 
indicated: “framing is at the heart of political discourse.” According to Kinder 
(2007, p. 158), “frames suggest how politics should be thought about, thereby 
encouraging citizens to understand events and issues in particular ways,” and as 
Perloff (2018, p. 159) concludes, “that is the essence of politics”.
Similarly, the way in which Wilson frames his reality in the following extract 
is also highly evident: 
Now remember I have never been an emotional European and I don't stand 
on this south goes look to us they come and you say there's a new Eurozone 
with that I am if and I am emotion I’m an emotional commonwealth of men 
it mattered a great deal to me when spontaneously the thirty-three heads of 
government all of the commonwealth said it matters to them that we stay in 
the market into some it matters very very much indeed.
As in the previous example, Wilson is also using a twofold strategy, but 
the other way round. May expressed full certainty and then presented the “fair” 
characteristics of her reality. Wilson started framing his reality by means of a 
highly sentimental and moving language: three times emotion(al) and three times 
“to matter,” and concluded with an expression of full certainty (indeed) preceded 
by an intensifier (very) which was repeated (“very, very much”). In this case he is 
appealing to his audience’s emotions, trying to make them feel and think the way 
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he feels and thinks. Two different scenarios (Anti-European May in the Brexit 
vs. Pro-European Wilson in the 1975 Referendum) used same rhetorical device. 
As Perloff (2018, p. 159) explains, “information provides the starting point, but 
frames connect the dots and build critical associations, inviting citizens to view 
the issue in particular ways.”
Extreme Case Formulations
Table 8 shows the distribution of these ECFs. The most significant conclusion 
is that the rate of ECFs used in the Anti-European recordings (1.24) was higher 
than in the Pro-European recordings (0.81; see Table 9).
As Edwards (2000) pointed out, these ECFs index the speaker’s stance or 
attitude. Thus, the Anti-European position could be regarded as an adversarial or 
defensive stance if we take into account one of the main uses of ECFs according 
to Pomerantz (1986). So, it seems that the Anti-European position was the most 
challenging one because it implied a definite break with Europe.
The next step was to analyze what specific types of ECFs were used in these 
recordings. Did these politicians use similar or different ECFs depending on their 
positions? Were some ECFs more popular than others? We have grouped all the 
ECFs according to their similarities and yielded the following results (see Table 
10):
This classification is not definite because in some cases, it is not so clear-cut. 
For example, in the case of never, it could have been included in the group of 
negation, but also in the group of adverbs of frequency. Another possible problem 
is that we mixed grammatical categories (nouns, adverbs, and adjectives) with 
descriptive categories (globalizing and exclusiveness). In this sense, we used 
Table 8. Distribution of extreme case formulations (ECFs).
Position Recordings Politician Number of ECFs Ratio
Anti-European
The 1975 Referendum
T. Benn 8 1.03
P. Shore 15 2.3
The Brexit
B. Johnson 5 0.6
T. May 12 1.3
Pro-European
The 1975 Referendum
H. Wilson 9 1.1
E. Heath 6 0.9
The Brexit
J. Corbyn 5 0.9
T. Blair 5 0.5
Total 65 1.03
Table 9. Extreme case formulations (ECFs) in the Anti- and Pro-European recordings.
Position Number of words Number of ECFs Ratio
Anti-European 3216 40 1.24
Pro-European 3090 25 0.81
Total 6306 65 1.03
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a two-fold classification. On the one hand, we identified ECFs with three clear 
functions: to globalize, to negate, and to exclude. Those words which did not 
fall into any of these functions but which, nevertheless, were ECFs, have been 
classified according to their grammatical categories (adverbs, adjectives, nouns, 
and numbers apart). The reasons behind this decision are: (a) not to omit any ECF 
from our classification, (b) to highlight the three most common functions we have 
found (to globalize, to negate, and to exclude), and (c) to research the possible 
relationships between the use of one specific grammatical category (ECF) and the 
political stance and/or time of the plebiscite. It is obvious that one word included 
in the group of globalizing, negations, or exclusiveness could also belong (from 
a grammatical point of view) to the group of adjectives/nouns/adverbs, but there 
is a very differentiating factor: they do not share the same function. To sum up, 
the adjectives, adverbs, and nouns included in their grammatical category group 
do not perform any of the globalizing, negation, or exclusiveness functions, they 
are just expressing a radical and extremist condition.
The most numerous ECFs were the negation and the globalizing ones. 
This is because these two features are at the core of the contest: rejection of 
an undesirable situation (either belonging or not belonging to the EU) and 
an allegation to be everyone’s choice (either the Pro- or the “Anti-European 
position). Thus, i analyzing the frequency of of these ECFs in each political 
position was pertinent. Table 11 shows the results of this analysis. Regardless of 
the time period, negation ECFs were much more numerous in the Anti-European 
position (0.34 vs. 0.06; see Table 12). This result was expected considering that 
Anti-European politicians’ motto was a complete rejection of their stay in the 
Table 10. Types of extreme case formulations
Type of ECFs ECFs Number
Negation
Nothing is agreed, never supported, not one word, not a comma, no longer 




Every part of our country, everything is agreed, every year, everything we do, 
you’ve all been waiting, wholesale change, all EU citizens, all their existing 
rights, all British citizens, all circumstances, all wages, about trading all, you 
worried it all, we look back on all this, whole deal, all of the commonwealth, 
whole of western Europe, whole of our democratic system, whole argument is 
about, whole thing, whole British country, whole hearted economic effort, to 






Absolutely clear, always be determined, always behind, I say absolutely, 
completely understand, perfectly sensible, ever fighting, completely 
different.
8
Adjectives The best, tiny, massive, huge, final, full (x2), vital, wildest, the worst. 10
Numbers Once in a lifetime, lots, my first and foremost 3
Nouns Coming to an end (x2), line by line. 3
Exclusiveness Only our courts, let alone (x2) 3
Total 65
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EU. However, interestingly, the Anti-European position was much more frequent 
in the 1975 Referendum recordings, because the rate of negation ECFs was 
overwhelmingly greater (0.7) than in the Brexit recordings (0.05). For example, 
consider the following excerpt from Peter Shore’s parliamentary speech:
Not one word, not a comma, let alone a clause, let alone a paragraph of 
the Rome Treaty – not one comma has been altered in order to meet the 
perfectly legitimate and serious differences that exist between Britain and 
the Common Market … What is the message that comes now? No longer to 
tell the British people about the goodies that lie there. No longer that. That 
won’t wash – will it? Because the evidence will no longer support it. So the 
message, the message that comes out is fear, fear, fear …Fear because you 
won’t have any food. Fear of unemployment. Fear that we’ve somehow been 
so reduced as a country that we can no longer, as it were, totter about in the 
world independent as a nation.
In this excerpt, Shore does not only use a significant number of negative 
ECFs but he even repeated them for emphatic purposes. He uses up to fives times 
the ECF “no longer,” which marks a definite and conclusive end of an adverse 
situation that has been going on for too long. The sentence “Not one word, not 
a comma, let alone a clause, let alone a paragraph of the Rome Treaty – not 
one comma” is stating in a radical way an apparently inflexible position when 
considering British idiosyncrasies in Europe. 
Table 11. Distribution of negation and globalizing extreme case formulations (ECFs).
Position Recordings Type of ECF





















Table 12. Negation extreme case formulations (ECFs) in the Anti- and Pro-European positions.
Position Number of words Number of Negation ECFs Ratio
Anti-European 3216 11 0.34
Pro-European 3090 2 0.06
Total 6306 13 0,21
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In the case of the globalizing ECFs, the differences were not as significant 
(0.37 for Anti-European recordings and 0.42 for Pro-European recordings; see 
Table 13). 
Both sides share a common goal: to make their listeners feel that they are “in 
the same boat” and that the speaker’s feeling is everyone’s feeling, and, much 
more specifically, a British feeling. We grouped together ECFs that indicate 
integration (e.g., every) and those that generalize a situation to a whole group 
(e.g., all/whole) for reasons of economy of space. Theresa May explains in a 
parliamentary speech that:
It means we will be able to use that money to invest in our priorities at home, 
such as housing, schools and the NHS, and it means the days of paying vast 
sums to the European Union every year are coming to an end. 
Here, May resorts to a national feeling (“our priorities at home”) of welfare 
that was previously ignored. So, she appeals to a common wish to end up with 
a continuous (“every year”) situation which was being detrimental to British 
society. On the Pro-European side, Jeremy Corbyn similarly appealed to British 
unity:
Importantly for British citizens living in EU countries, can the Prime Minister 
confirm that the Government’s negotiations mean that they will maintain all 
their existing rights indefinitely? Will she confirm today that UK pensions 
will continue to be paid and uprated for all British citizens?
This is part of a long series of rhetorical questions aimed at the enhancement 
of British citizens’ rights. Corbyn’s argument is that British citizens will witness a 
cutback on their rights as a result of their segregation from the EU. So, again, both 
positions use similar globalizing strategies when trying to persuade their listeners.
Adverbs of frequency, degree, and manner and adjective ECFs also represented 
an important number (18 in total). Table 14 shows their detailed distribution.
Regardless of their position, all speakers showed the same distribution in the 
use of adverbs of frequency, degree, and manner (0.12 vs. 0.13) and adjective 
ECFs (0.15 vs. 0.16; see Table 15)
Nevertheless, the use of ECF adjectives was always far more frequent in 
the 1975 Referendum regardless of the expressed position. In the case of the 
Anti-European position, the ratio in the 1975 Referendum was 0.21 in contrast 
Table 13. Globalising extreme case formulations (ECFs) in the Anti- and Pro-European positions
Position Number of words Number of Globalizing ECFs Ratio
Anti-European 3216 12 0.37
Pro-European 3090 13 0.42
Total 6306 25 0.39
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to 0.11 in the Brexit. In the case of the Pro-European position, the ratio in the 
1975 Referendum was 0.2 in contrast to 0.13 in the Brexit. Adjectives are mainly 
descriptive in their nature, so it seems that politicians in the 1975 Referendum 
contest wanted to be very descriptive and pictorial in a situation which was 
completely new to British citizens, and they wanted to illustrate it in the most 
extremist and radical way. In the following excerpt it can be seen how Harold 
Wilson uses the adjective vital in a political interview:
but for example in trade figures which are vital to the whole question of the 
balance of payments in the path and they have measurably increased in the 
last quarter of last year 
He does not only use the extreme adjective vital, but he also uses the 
globalizing ECF “whole” in the same sentence. So, it seems that the tone of 
his speech when talking about negative economic consequences of the Common 
Market is completely irrefutable and radical. 
In the case of the adverbs, differences were practically nonexistent. The only 
difference concerned the use of adverbs by politicians in the 1975 Referendum in 
Table 14. Distribution of "adverbs of frequency, degree, and manner" and "adjectives” extreme case 
formulations (ECFs).
























Table 15. Adverb and adjective extreme case formulations (ECFs) in the Anti- and Pro-European position 
recordings.
Position Number of words Number of Adverb ECFs Number of Adjective ECFs
Anti-European 3216 4(Ratio: 0.12
5
(Ratio: 0.15)
Pro-European 3090 4(Ratio: 0.13)
5
(Ratio: 0.16)
Total 6306 8(Ratio: 0.13)
10
(Ratio: 0.16)
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the Anti- (0.14) and Pro-European (0.06) positions. Still, these differences were 
insignificant: two adverbs (always and absolutely) in the Anti-European position 
and one (“ever fighting”) in the Pro-European position. 
Finally, in the case of number, noun, and exclusiveness ECFs, Table 16 
shows the detailed distribution data.
The ratios in this case were generally low. The only outstanding feature was 
that they were much more frequent in the Anti-European positions. For example, 
the numbers ECFs in the Anti-European position have ratios of 0.07 and 0.05, 
but in the Pro-European position, the ratio is just 0.06 in the 1975 Referendum 
recordings and it is nonexistent in the Brexit recordings. In the case of noun ECFs, 
in the Anti-European recordings, position the ratio was 0 (The 1975 Referendum) 
and 0.17 (the Brexit), and an absolute 0 in the Pro-European position recordings. 
Finally, in the case of exclusiveness ECFs, in the Anti-European position, the 
ratio was 0.14 (The 1975 Referendum) and 0.05 (the Brexit); and an absolute 0 
in the Pro-European recordings. The most revealing facts were the 0.14 ratio of 
exclusiveness ECFs in The 1975 Referendum (Anti-European position) and the 
0.17 ratio of noun ECFs in the Brexit (Anti-Europe position). In the former case, 
Shore’s words are very illustrating:
It was not negotiated, it was accepted. Not one word, not a comma, let alone 
a clause, let alone a paragraph of the Rome Treaty – not one comma has been 
altered in order to meet the perfectly legitimate and serious differences that 
exist between Britain and the Common Market.
In this excerpt, Shore wants to emphasize that nothing was negotiated, not 
even the smallest elements, and he pinpoints very singular elements like commas, 
Table 16. Distribution of "numbers, nouns, and exclusiveness" extreme case formulations (ECFs).




























clauses, or paragraphs. He is taking to the extreme the lack of negotiations in 
contrast to just acceptance and resignation.
In the following example, it can be seen how Theresa May uses noun ECFs 
to exemplify her position against the EU:
These are the actions of a responsible nation honouring the commitments 
that it has made to its allies, having gone through those commitments line by 
line, as we said we would. . . and it means the days of paying vast sums to the 
European Union every year are coming to an end
So, she describes the way to go through those commitments as “line by line,” 
that means with no exceptions, with no veto. A few lines later, she even refers 
to the days to pay money to the EU as “coming to an end,” and that means 
with no possible extension of time. So, she is definite, radical, and conclusive 
in her speech, admitting no exceptions to her position. As has been previously 
mentioned, more radical positions are being preferred by the Anti-European 
politicians. They want to show a total negation to the situation they are showing 
as radically negative to British interests.
In the following excerpt taken from Shore’s parliamentary speech against the 
permanence of the UK in the EU, the way he frames a radical reality can be seen:
The whole thing is an absurdity! And therefore I urge you, I urge you to 
reject it. I urge you to say ‘No’ to this motion! And I urge the whole British 
country to say ‘No’ on Thursday in the referendum!
Shore does not use expressions like “the thing is absurd” or “the British 
country.” Instead, he says, “the whole thing” and “the whole British country.” 
In this way, the scopes of “thing” and “British country” are extended to the 
maximum. Similarly, he does not say “I ask you.” Instead, he says “I urge you” 
up to three times. In contrast to “ask,” “urge” conveys severe insistence because 
it means to advise someone very strongly about something. He uses “I urge 
you” three times because this number is related to a very well-known political 
rhetorical device called the three-part list. According to Heritage & Greatbatch 
(1986, p. 116), it is “regularly used in political speeches and regularly associated 
with the generation of applause.” As Atkinson (1984, p. 60) points out, repetition 
helps "to strengthen, underline, or amplify almost any kind of message.” Finally, 
Shore uses the negation “no” twice and the verb to reject, which projects absolute 
disagreement. So, this excerpt transmits a total, radical, and extremist rejection 
to the permanence of the UK in the EU. As Abelson (1995, p. 25) explains, “one 
social arena in which extreme attitudes are consequential is that of intergroup 
conflict, because conflict can breed attitude extremity, which in turn serves to 
maintain or increase conflict.” It is a widely known fact that the political arena is 
a conflict arena per se. By means of these strategies, Shore is framing a particular 
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reality that absolutely and totally rejects the permanence of the UK in the EU.
Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to discover if politicians in the 1975 
Referendum and the Brexit: (a) framed a similar or different reality through their 
discourse choices and (b) used the same types of adverbs of certainty and ECFs 
with the same frequency.
The first conclusion is that even though there were some similarities 
regarding their discourse choices (e.g., regardless of the time or the position, 
the politicians were more prone to display extreme opinions than to demonstrate 
certainty), there were some differences. For instance, the low ratio of adverbs 
of certainty in the Anti-European 1975 Referendum (0.07) and the high ratio of 
ECFs in the Anti-European 1975 Referendum (1.61). This connects with Gross 
et al.’s (1995, p. 218) comment that “extremity and certainty share conceptual 
and empirical meaning, but whereas extremity connotes certainty, certainty does 
not necessarily imply extremity.” As a matter of fact, the Anti-European position 
(no matter the time) was always much more inclined to use ECFs (1.24 vs. 0.81). 
It could be related to the view of the reality they wanted to frame: negation, 
detachment, and renunciation to a settled situation.
The second conclusion concerns the use and frequency of same types of 
adverbs of certainty and ECFs. The first result is related to the low rate of adverbs 
of certainty (0.17) in contrast to the high rate of ECFs (1.03). As we pointed 
out, this shows that politicians, no matter the time (The 1975 Referendum or 
The Brexit) or the position (Anti- or Pro-European), are more prone to display 
extreme opinions than to demonstrate certainty. When it comes to ECFs, the 
most frequent ones were the globalizing ECFs (0.39) followed by the negation 
ECFs (0.21). Globalizing ECFs followed a similar distribution in both, the Anti- 
(0.37) and the Pro-European (0.42) positions. As it was previously stated, in both 
cases the aim is the same: to make their voters feel that they share the same 
nationalistic feelings, no matter if you are in the Anti- or in the Pro-European 
position. Negation ECFs were not distributed as evenly: regardless of the time, 
negation ECFs were much more frequent in the Anti-European position (0.34 vs. 
0.06). As it was mentioned, this result is predictable if we take into consideration 
that their motto was a kind of “No Europe.” 
To sum up, we can confirm Edwards’ words (2004. p. 260) that “people 
are shown to formulate or work up the nature of events, actions, and their own 
accountability, through ways of talking. These “ways of talking” are constructive 
and action-oriented.” That is to say, there is a strong connection between the 
selection of our words and the reality we build. Language and reality are two 
enduring sides of the same coin. As we have already indicated, Scheufele (1999) 
argued that individuals can frame their own reality, and this is particularly evident 
in the case of political communication. Taking into account Kaid et al.’s (1991) 
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description of the components of political reality (i.e. (an objective reality; a 
subjective reality and a constructed reality), in this particular scenario, the 
objective reality is the potential exit of the UK from the EU, the subjective reality 
is made up of the politicians’ perceptions of this reality, a reality that they frame 
by means of their specific discursive choices; and the constructed reality is the 
reality that the media frame, also by means of their specific discursive choices.
Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this paper to present general and 
definite claims about the 1975 Referendum- and the Brexit-specific styles but 
rather to show the different discursive strategies used by politicians when they try 
to build their own objective interpretation of a single common reality.
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